Global Arab Network | Lack of diplomatic decisiveness - American policy in Somalia in the spotlight

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Lack of diplomatic decisiveness - American policy in Somalia in the spotlight

Global Arab Network - Arab Media Watch

Sunday, 15 August 2010 18:45

Somalia_-_Record_number_of_displaced_at_1.5_million

Once the dust has settled on the twin bomb blasts that killed 74 and injured 70 in Kampala, Uganda, US foreign policy in East Africa will inevitably be drawn into focus much more sharply than had been expected, highlighting the lack of diplomatic decisiveness that had previously been on display.

That the attacks on Uganda, the nation that contributes the majority of the troops to the African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia, have been attributed to Al Shabaab, a Somali group inspired by Al Qaeda, only confirms what for sometime many have feared: that more and more, Somalia is becoming fertile ground for groups inspired by Al Qaeda. This is the first time Al Shabaab have struck outside Somalia.

Even prior to these attacks, questions were being increasingly asked of US policy in Somalia, prompted and fuelled partly by incidents such as the arrest in New York of two Somalia-bound US citizens who were later charged with conspiring to kill, maim and kidnap people outside the US, and partly by the belief in some quarters that the horse that US policy is backing is not quite the right one.

Many analysts and observers agree it is time for some sort of shift or reassessment of US policy, coupled with a clearer definition of foreign policy objectives, but the undecided and all-important aspect is whether that shift is one of degree or category.

Exponents of the 'war on terror' will point out that there is plentiful evidence that the US has interests in the future of Somalia, particularly given the overarching context of transnational jihadism in which Al Qaeda seeks to export its violent ideology to extremist groups anywhere it could take hold.

In September 2009, a Somali American from Seattle killed 21 peacekeepers by driving a truck bomb into an African Union base in Mogadishu, while both American and Somali security officials have indicated that the leaders of Somalia's main extremist groups have worked closely with wanted members of Al Qaeda.

In total, some 20 Somali Americans are estimated to have joined the ranks of the foreign fighters of Al Shabaab, which was designated a terrorist organisation by the US in 2008. These ranks also include experienced Afghans and Pakistanis, who not only import jihadist tactics seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also take up leadership roles within the organisation.

One further complicating aspect is piracy; concerns have been raised about the connection between piracy ransoms and funding of terrorism; some experts estimate that Somali pirates have received more than $100 million in ransoms.

When viewed in this context, the transnational aspect of Somalia's chaos comes to the fore, and the Uganda bombings are a painful case in point. There are many analysts who see lawless, 'ungoverned spaces' as the ideal incubators for terrorism - and obligingly, Somalia has just been designated top of Foreign Policy magazine's 2010 Failed States Index.

Opposing Somalia's extremists is the Western-backed but underfunded Transitional Federal Government, supported by some 6,000 AU troops, sourced mostly from Uganda and Burundi.

But this is increasingly seen by many as an imperfect scenario. Commonly-cited concerns include civilian deaths arising from mortar fire and fighting in densely populated areas, and tales of corruption, and poor discipline and morale among irregularly paid government troops. The higher standards that the transitional government should be held to are met by uncritical support from its Western-backers, critics allege.

This reveals a tension in foreign policy between two variables: 'people we can do business with,' and 'people we can't.' There comes a point when the former comes too close to the latter, and the TFG's detractors feel this point is close by.

If change in policy is afoot, then what will it consist of? Given the stakes involved and the uncomfortable relationship that the 2010 Failed States Index champion has with transnational jihadism and US home-grown terrorists (which the two Americans qualify as), disengaging and restricting counter-terrorism efforts to intelligence-led air strikes, as some propose, seems too liable to miss its objectives.

When Kenyan Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan was killed on 14 September 2009 by a US strike, he was with other Al Shabaab members at the time, and the operation was heralded as a success because there was no 'collateral damage.' However, several previous attempts to kill him were not so 'clinical,' and civilians died as a result, revealing the limitations of this approach.

This naturally causes resentment - as it has in numerous cases in Afghanistan - and the negative ramifications of imprecise strikes can act as a recruiter of further numbers. Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, listed in court during a June hearing drone attacks as one of the chief grievances against US conduct in its 'war on terror,' fuelling and expanding continued resistance.

Without US support - and therefore Western support in general - the AU peacekeepers in Mogadishu will find their mandate severely weakened and likely leave, allowing Al Shabaab to overrun the government, which relies on the AU's military muscle. As things stand, Al Shabaab is unpopular and divided, but still rules its areas repressively, meting out its draconian punishments of public beheadings, stoning and amputations.

Some would argue that the policy framework of presenting the TFG as the key to good governance and a bulwark against terrorism is too simplistic, but there are no ideal options. The Western-backed government, mandated by the UN Security Council and supported by AU troops, could still act as a better transmitter of legitimacy that sees Somalis themselves undertake the job of rebuilding Somalia.

If the main criticism is that the policy of supporting the TFG is not bearing fruit, then it is up to the TFG to broaden its appeal and strength, and be supported in these aims by the international stakeholders who should not shy away from critiquing and coaching government performance. Behind the politics, a real humanitarian crisis is underway, with about 1.5 million Somalis displaced and half the population in urgent need of humanitarian aid.

It is the interests of both the US and the Somali government to deliver firm, measurable results sooner rather than later.

Global Arab Network

Guy Gabriel, AMW adviser, for more articles by Arab Media Watch click HERE

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