No Room for Treason: Confronting Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan

For seven decades, the undying motto of the Moroccan state has been proclaimed at ceremonies and military parades, sung by the urban masses, and inscribed on the hilltops of the rural countryside: Allah, al-Watan, al-Malik (Ar. “God, the Nation, the King”). The first element affirms Morocco’s institutional commitment to the values espoused by the Maliki interpretation of the Islamic faith. The second embodies the nation’s unity, a product of the interwoven histories of its Arab, Amazigh (Berber), Jewish, and Mediterranean peoples, bound by a shared destiny. The third asserts the spiritual and temporal power of the royal family, heirs to the ‘Alaouite dynasty whose rule has endured since the seventeenth century.1 The declaration is not merely a slogan, but an acknowledgement of collective duty.

Yet, there are those who seek to unravel this carefully woven fabric. Among them, none pose a greater challenge to Morocco’s order than Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan (Ar. “Justice and Spirituality”). Cloaking itself in a thin veneer of piety, this Islamist movement does not merely advocate for reform: it rejects the very foundations upon which the Moroccan state is built. It spurns the monarchy, openly challenges the religious legitimacy of the throne, and envisions a nation stripped of the pluralism that has defined it for centuries.2 Where the national motto affirms faith and sovereignty, Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan seeksdivision, discord, and a dangerous flirtation with ideological absolutism. 

Founded in the shadows of the 1970s by Abdessalam Yassine, a figure whose vision was shaped by a blend of Sufi mysticism and radical rejectionism, the movement masquerades as a non-violent actor. However, its agenda is anything but benign. Yassine’s foundational texts cast doubt upon the very legitimacy of the Moroccan monarchy, an institution whose historical and religious credentials far outweigh the sectarian interpretations pushed by Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan. By denying King Mohammed VI’s title as Amir al-Mu’minin (Ar. “Commander of the Faithful”), the movement challenges an authority that has safeguarded Morocco from the destructive waves of extremism that have engulfed other nations in the region.3

Unlike the legally recognized Islamist parties that have sought reform within the constitutional framework, such as the Justice and Development Party (PJD), Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan deliberately avoids engagement with the formal political process. Instead, it has built a shadow network across Morocco’s neighbourhoods, inserting itself into the fabric of daily life through informal education programs, charity drives, and social initiatives. These activities are not acts of goodwill but calculated measures designed to build parallel structures of influence, eroding state legitimacy from the inside out. Its female members, for instance, actively use social welfare initiatives as ideological recruitment tools, embedding the movement deeper into communities while systematically fostering opposition to state institutions.4

Central to Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan’s success is its rigid hierarchy, where absolute authority rests with the murshid (Ar. “spiritual guide”), a status Yassine cultivated to demand unwavering loyalty. According to Sufi tradition, the murshid is considered beyond reproach, his decisions unquestionable. In Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan, this reverence is institutionalised: followers are stripped of decision-making power, and the murshid retains the unilateral right to make executive decisions without consultation.5 Dissent is equated with religious defiance, forcing members to submit to the movement’s rigid structure. Under the guise of spirituality, Al-Adl silences critical thought and enforces ideological conformity, contradicting its ownspurious claims of justice and reform. 

Moreover, Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan strategically targets society’s most vulnerable. Unlike other Islamist groups that seek middle-class professionals, Al-Adl focuses its recruitment efforts on the urban poor, particularly in the distressed areasof Tangier, Rabat, Marrakech, and Casablanca. It preys on the frustrations of unemployed youth, exploiting economic hardship to expand its influence.6 The irony is stark: a movement that claims to stand for justice deliberately fosters dependency among the most desperate, using the guise ofsocial services to secure political allegiance. Rather than offering genuine uplift, it manufactures a cycle of reliance, reinforcing its grip on those with the least means to resist.

The movement has also mastered the art of sacralised dissent, co-opting legitimate grievances to advance its own agenda. During the 2011 protests of the 20 February movement, Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan exploited the calls for political reform, using the demonstrations as a platform to spread its message while refusing to participate in any constitutional dialogue.7 This opportunistic approach only served to demonstrate its fundamental unwillingness to engage in good faith with Morocco’s political evolution.

While Morocco has embraced a model of tolerant Islam, Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan remains an outlier, a movement unwilling to accept the nation’s trajectory toward religious moderation. Its insistence on a rigid interpretation of governance, rooted in an archaic vision that disregards centuries of Moroccan statecraft, is a threat to stability. The so-called “justice” it advocates is selective, and the “spirituality” it promotes is nothing but a thinly veiled attempt to manipulate religious sentiments for political gain.

The legitimacy granted to Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan by useful imbeciles in illustrious Western thinktanks, notably the Brookings Institution, have only emboldened its members to celebrate and encourage terrorist acts committed against Morocco’s strategic partners.8 Further, it is a movement whose fundamental agenda and public statements contravene Article 179 of the Moroccan Penal Code, which punishes defamation, insults, and the lack of respect and reverence for the King, the Crown Prince, and members of the royal family. Put simply, its members should be rotting in prison for their continued promotion of seditious action and organised chaos.9  

The Moroccan state, through its institutions and its people, must remain vigilant against this ideological insurgency. Al-Adl Wal-Ihsan’s tactics may be subtle, but its ultimate goal is clear: to dismantle the constitutional monarchy and impose its own vision upon Morocco. A movement that rejects the principles of Allah, al-Watan, al-Malik cannot be allowed to determine the nation’s future. It is a truism that the forces of hatred and violence expand inexorably to fill the void that is left for them. The Moroccan people have long stood resilient against extremism, and they must continue to do so, ensuring that the Islamist factions are given no chance to

Relations. 

[1] Christopher Silver, “The Sounds of Nationalism: Music, Moroccanism, and the Making of Samy Elmaghribi”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 52 (2020), p. 44-45. Also Jonathan Wyrtzen, Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity (Cornell University Press, 2013), p. ix-7. 

[2] https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20250128-morocco-islamists-challenge-monarchy-hint-at-political-comeback/, accessed 18 March 2025. 

[3] https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/03/81918/al-adl-wa-al-ihsane-lampshade-morocco-tolerant-islam/ accessed 18 March 2025.  

[4] Meriem Yafout (trans. Andrew Brown), “The Activities of Adl Wal Ihsane in the Neighbourhoods. How to Build a ‘Non-Legal’ Consensus from a ‘Tolerated’ Conflict”, International Development Policy Review, 8 (2017), pp. 110; also Yafout, “Women’s Ijtihād as a Strategy for Liberation: Emancipatory Interpretations within the Women’s Section of Al Adl Wal Ihsane”, Comparative Islamic Studies, 12:1-2 (206), p. 81. 

[5] Kassem Bahaji, ““Moroccan Islamists: Integration, Confrontation, And Ordinary Muslims.” Middle East Review of International Affairs, 15:1 (2011), p. 44. 

[6] https://www.hudson.org/national-security-defense/islamism-and-the-state-in-morocco, accessed 18 March 2025. 

[7] Alison L. McManus, “Deliberative street politics and sacralized dissent: Morocco’s 20 February movement and the Jamaa Al Adl Wal Ihsane”, Social Movement Studies, 15:6 (2016), p. 645. 

[8] https://www.timesofisrael.com/moroccan-man-handed-two-year-jail-term-for-praising-terror-attack-in-israel/amp/, accessed 18 March 2025. 

[9] Kingdom of Morocco, Dahir No. 1.59.413, Moroccan Penal Code, Article 179.