The Importance of Proscribing the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the UK

Introduction: The Debate Over Proscribing the IRGC in the UK

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a multifaceted organization also known as the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, constitutes a primary branch of Iran’s armed forces, officially established in May 1979 in the wake of the Iranian Revolution by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.1 Unlike the conventional Iranian Army, whose primary role is to safeguard the nation’s sovereignty, the IRGC’s constitutional mandate is centered on upholding the integrity of the Islamic Republic, preventing external interference, and suppressing any internal movements perceived as threats to the revolution’s ideological foundations.2 Over the decades since its inception, the IRGC has evolved into a powerful and deeply entrenched institution within Iran, extending its influence across the political landscape, the national economy – encompassing critical sectors such as energy and food production – and the broader fabric of Iranian society.2

The unique position of the IRGC as both a significant military force and a dominant political and economic actor within Iran signifies that its actions carry substantial weight and have far-reaching consequences. This necessitates a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of its influence when considering policy responses from the international community, including the United Kingdom. The IRGC’s mandate to protect the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary ideology extends its operational scope beyond traditional military functions, encompassing domestic affairs and the suppression of dissent. This multi-faceted influence requires careful consideration of the potential ramifications of a UK ban from various perspectives.

In recent years, the UK has increasingly voiced concerns regarding the IRGC’s activities in the Middle East, which are seen as destabilizing the region. These concerns are primarily centered on the IRGC’s extensive support for proxy groups, including Lebanese Hezbollah and Palestinian Hamas, both of which have already been proscribed as terrorist organizations within the UK.2 Furthermore, a growing body of evidence suggests the IRGC’s direct involvement in activities within the UK itself, encompassing espionage operations, surveillance of individuals, and the orchestration of plots targeting Iranian dissidents and journalists who are critical of the Tehran regime.13

In response to these concerns and activities, there has been growing pressure from various stakeholders for the UK government to take a stronger stance against the IRGC. This includes calls from politicians across the political spectrum, security experts who have witnessed the IRGC’s malign influence firsthand, and human rights organizations that have documented its repressive actions. These voices are urging the UK to align its policy with key international allies, such as the United States, Canada, and Sweden, all of whom have already made the significant decision to designate the IRGC as a terrorist organization.2 The UK’s apparent hesitation to ban the IRGC, despite the actions of its closest allies and the growing evidence of IRGC-linked threats within its own borders, suggests a complex decision-making process that likely involves a careful balancing of diplomatic considerations and national security imperatives.

This report will argue that proscribing the IRGC under the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 is a crucial step for safeguarding national security, aligning with key international allies who have already taken this decisive action, and upholding the UK’s commitment to human rights and democratic values in the face of the IRGC’s documented malign activities. The report will also address the primary arguments and considerations raised against such a proscription, including the potential impact on diplomatic relations with Iran, the legal definitions surrounding terrorism and state entities, the effectiveness of a ban compared to existing measures, and concerns about potential unintended consequences or Iranian retaliation. By examining the evidence and considering the various perspectives, this analysis aims to contribute to a more informed understanding of the importance of banning the IRGC in the UK.

Understanding the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)

Historical Origins and Evolution: From Revolutionary Militia to Powerful Institution

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was established in May 1979 by order of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini following the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran.1 Its initial purpose was to unify and organize the various paramilitary forces that emerged during the revolution, serving as a loyal force to the new Islamic government and acting as a counterweight to the regular army, which was perceived as potentially loyal to the Shah.2 Originating as a network of militant activists devoted to Khomeini, the IRGC played a significant role in suppressing dissenting voices and consolidating the power of the new clerical regime in the early months after the revolution.3

Over time, the IRGC evolved from a loosely organized paramilitary force into a formal military branch, enshrined in the Iranian Constitution with a mandate to protect the Islamic Republic and its achievements.2 This included preventing foreign interference, thwarting coups by the traditional military, and crushing “deviant movements” that harmed the ideological legacy of the Islamic Revolution.2 The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) was a defining period for the IRGC, leading to significant growth in its manpower, operational capabilities, and political influence. It emerged from the war as a parallel military structure to the regular armed forces, with substantial autonomy.6

The IRGC’s transformation from an ideological militia into a powerful, multi-faceted institution deeply embedded in the Iranian state highlights its enduring commitment to the foundational principles of the Islamic Revolution, which continue to shape its objectives and actions both domestically and internationally. Understanding this historical evolution is crucial because it reveals that the IRGC’s primary loyalty lies with the ideology of the revolution and the Supreme Leader, rather than solely with the territorial integrity of Iran, explaining its willingness to engage in extraterritorial activities to advance its revolutionary goals.

Structure and Organization: Military Branches, the Quds Force, and the Basij

The IRGC is a combined arms force, mirroring the structure of a conventional military, with its own ground forces, navy, air force (Aerospace Force), intelligence organization, and special forces.2 It operates in parallel and separately from Iran’s regular army (Artesh), focusing on asymmetric warfare and less traditional duties such as controlling smuggling and the Strait of Hormuz.2 As of 2024, the IRGC had approximately 125,000 total personnel.2 The IRGC Navy has become Iran’s primary force exercising operational control over the Persian Gulf, serving as a de facto coast guard.2

The IRGC also controls the Basij militia (Organization for Mobilization of the Oppressed), a volunteer-based paramilitary force with approximately 90,000 active personnel and a further estimated 300,000 reservists.2 The Basij serves as the IRGC’s morality and anti-riot police domestically 5 and also plays a role in intelligence gathering and surveillance against all sectors of Iranian society.75

The Quds Force (Jerusalem Force) is a specialized unit within the IRGC focused on conducting extraterritorial operations and supporting allied militant groups abroad.4 It acts as Iran’s primary tool for projecting power and influence across the Middle East through proxy warfare, providing training, weapons, funds, and military advice to groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis.4 The Quds Force is considered Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist activity abroad.16

The IRGC also possesses its own intelligence organization, known as the Intelligence Organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, which was formed in 2009 and operates independently of the regular military and sometimes in competition with the Ministry of Intelligence (MOIS).2 This intelligence apparatus plays a crucial role in both domestic suppression and the regime’s activities abroad, including gathering intelligence and conducting surveillance.75

The IRGC’s command structure is hierarchical, with the Supreme Leader of Iran at the apex, followed by the IRGC commander-in-chief.6 Subordinate to the commander-in-chief are the commanders of the Quds Force, various military branches, the head of intelligence, and the commander of the Basij Forces.6 Notably absent from this command structure is the Iranian president or any other member of Iran’s civilian government, highlighting the IRGC’s direct accountability to the Supreme Leader.6

The IRGC’s distinct and comprehensive organizational structure, with its own military branches, paramilitary force, expeditionary unit, and intelligence agencies, underscores its significant capabilities and its ability to operate autonomously both within Iran and internationally, posing a multifaceted security challenge. This detailed structure demonstrates that the IRGC is not merely a component of the Iranian military but a powerful and independent actor with the resources and reach to pursue its own agenda, including activities that directly threaten the UK.

Core Objectives and Ideology: Protecting the Revolution and Exporting its Ideals

The fundamental objective of the IRGC is to preserve the Islamic Republic of Iran and the ideals of the 1979 revolution.2 It combines traditional military roles with a relentless focus on perceived domestic and foreign enemies.3 The IRGC is rigidly loyal to Iran’s clerical elite, particularly the Supreme Leader, who holds ultimate authority over the organization.3 Its constitutional mandate is interpreted broadly to include preventing foreign interference, thwarting coups, and crushing “deviant movements” that harm the ideological legacy of the Islamic Revolution.2

A core tenet of the IRGC’s ideology is the commitment to exporting the Islamic Revolution worldwide.3 It views its task as preserving the “Islamic republican” form of government created by Khomeini and faithfully implementing the instructions of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.3 The IRGC espouses a radical ideology and a paranoid worldview, often treating political beliefs inconsistent with “revolutionary ideals” as military threats.3 It sees its foreign mission as aiding revolutionary movements, resistance movements, and oppressed peoples worldwide.5 This mission is rooted in a belief in the earthly enforcement of divine will, invested in an elite group who are the “guardians” of strict Shia Islamist principles.6

The deeply ingrained ideology of the IRGC, centered on the protection and expansion of the Islamic Revolution and unwavering loyalty to the Supreme Leader, serves as the primary motivation for its actions, including its support for terrorism and its hostile activities targeting perceived enemies, both within Iran and abroad. This ideological imperative means that the IRGC’s behavior is not solely driven by pragmatic state interests but also by a fundamental belief in the global mandate of its revolutionary project, making it a persistent and ideologically motivated threat.

The IRGC’s Role and Influence Within Iran: Politics, Economy, and Society

Originating as an ideological militia, the IRGC has progressively expanded its role into nearly every facet of Iranian life, including politics, economics (with a dominant stake in sectors like energy and food), and society.2 By 2010, it was described by BBC News as a “business empire,” and by 2019, Reuters called it an “industrial empire with political clout”.2 Through a network of linked front companies, the IRGC has established a dominant stake in Iran’s economic sector, exerting control over strategic industries to ensure loyalty to the Supreme Leader.3 This economic influence was further strengthened after the imposition of American sanctions in 2010, as the IRGC established numerous companies to circumvent the sanctions through large-scale smuggling operations.9

The IRGC plays a critical role in suppressing domestic dissent and controlling civil society through its extensive intelligence and security operations, including the Basij militia, which has been used to crack down on anti-government protesters.2 The IRGC’s Intelligence Organization is considered the most powerful security entity in Iran and can influence court rulings through its allied judges.78

Under presidents like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a veteran of the IRGC, the organization’s political representation and economic power ballooned, with numerous former IRGC officers appointed to senior government posts and the IRGC awarded lucrative government contracts.6 Many Western analysts believe that the IRGC’s expanded social, political, military, and economic role has led it to surpass even the country’s ruling clerical class in terms of political power.2 The IRGC does not have even the pretense of civilian oversight or institutional restraint beyond the decrees of the Supreme Leader, existing independently of both the Parliament and Ministry of Foreign Affairs.6

The IRGC’s pervasive influence across all aspects of Iranian society demonstrates its immense power and its ability to operate with minimal civilian oversight, making it a key driver of both Iran’s domestic and foreign policies and a significant obstacle to reform or moderation within the country. This entrenched power structure suggests that any external pressure, such as a UK ban, would likely be met with resistance and could potentially lead to unpredictable reactions from the IRGC.

The IRGC as a Global and Domestic Security Threat

Extraterritorial Operations: Support for Proxy Groups and Destabilizing Activities in the Middle East and Beyond

The IRGC serves as Iran’s primary instrument for exporting its revolutionary ideology globally and is the main conduit through which the regime supports its network of terrorist proxies to enhance its international influence.3 It is tasked with preserving the Islamic Republic and the ideals of the 1979 revolution, and it combines traditional military roles with a relentless focus on perceived domestic and foreign enemies.3 The IRGC is Iran’s main link to its terrorist proxies, which the regime uses to boost Iran’s global influence.3

The IRGC’s expeditionary arm, the Quds Force, plays a central role in this effort by training, equipping, and funding a wide array of proxy groups across the Middle East and beyond, including Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in the Palestinian territories, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia militias in Iraq, and the Houthis in Yemen, as well as elements of the Taliban in Afghanistan.4 Some of these surrogates have targeted Western forces in the Middle East.5 The Quds Force is considered Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist activity abroad.16

The IRGC has been deeply involved in regional conflicts, providing significant support to the Assad regime during the Syrian Civil War 4 and playing a part in conflicts in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen.4 It has been described as the most destabilizing force in the Middle East.11 The IRGC has inserted itself into virtually every conflict in the Middle East, from Syria and Lebanon to Yemen and Iraq.11

The IRGC’s foreign policy goals include building Iranian regional dominance in the Middle East and western Afghanistan, exporting the revolution, and supporting states that attack enemies of Iran, primarily the United States, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.5 It has even built a land bridge through Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon to the Mediterranean Sea, fulfilling a long-term strategic goal.5 The IRGC is hailed as the custodian of many causes, from liberating Jerusalem and safeguarding Islam to combating the leadership of the United States’ allies and proxies in the Middle East.5

The IRGC’s extensive extraterritorial operations and its central role in supporting a network of violent proxy groups underscore its commitment to a regional and potentially global revolutionary agenda, posing a significant threat to international peace and security. This pattern of behavior, which includes providing resources and direction to groups engaged in terrorism and armed conflict, clearly demonstrates the IRGC’s role as a major destabilizing actor in the Middle East and a key driver of conflict in the region.

The IRGC’s Footprint in the UK: Espionage, Surveillance, and Targeting of Dissidents and Journalists

The UK’s domestic intelligence agency, MI5, has publicly acknowledged a significant and growing threat emanating from Iran’s “aggressive intelligence services,” including the IRGC, with evidence of plots to kidnap or assassinate individuals residing in the UK.13 MI5’s Director General revealed that numerous Iran-backed plots have been thwarted in recent years, indicating a sustained effort by the IRGC to conduct hostile activities on UK soil.13

The IRGC has been actively involved in recruiting British Muslims, particularly those of Shia background, to conduct espionage activities within the UK, focusing on gathering intelligence on prominent British Jews, synagogues, and opponents of the Iranian regime.22 These recruitment efforts often occur during religious pilgrimages to holy Shia sites in Iran and Iraq.22 Furthermore, there is evidence that the IRGC utilizes UK-based organized criminal networks to carry out surveillance and intimidation of Iranian dissidents and potentially to prepare for or execute attacks on targets within the UK, including prominent Jewish figures.13

The IRGC has been implicated in plotting assassinations on UK soil, with specific instances involving attempts to target British-Iranian journalists working for the Tehran-critical Iran International television network in London.13 These plots have led to heightened security concerns and even the temporary relocation of journalists.17 Recent charges against individuals in the UK for suspected espionage on behalf of Iran’s intelligence services, targeting UK-based journalists, further underscore the ongoing threat.24

The documented activities of the IRGC within the UK, ranging from espionage and recruitment to direct threats and assassination plots, clearly demonstrate that the organization poses a tangible and escalating threat to UK national security and the safety of its citizens. This evidence directly contradicts the notion that the IRGC’s threat is limited to the Middle East and underscores the urgency for the UK government to take decisive action to counter its presence and activities within the country.

Links to Terrorism and Extremism: Evidence from International Designations and UK Intelligence

The IRGC has been officially designated as a terrorist organization by several nations, including Bahrain, Canada, Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Sweden, and the United States.2 Canada’s designation in June 2024 explicitly cited the IRGC’s terrorist acts both independently and in association with other listed terrorist entities like Hezbollah and Hamas.15 Sweden’s Prime Minister has also urged the EU to list the IRGC as a terrorist organization, citing its destructive role in the region and escalating actions within Europe.68

The United States designated the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in April 2019, recognizing its active participation in, financing, and promotion of terrorism as a tool of statecraft.4

UK intelligence assessments have consistently highlighted the IRGC as an ongoing threat to the UK, with the head of MI5 warning of regime death squads operating in the UK and repeated attempts to kill or kidnap UK citizens.13

Research by the Tony Blair Institute has exposed the IRGC’s internal training manuals, revealing a violent and extremist ideology based on a distortion of Islamic scripture, similar to other proscribed Islamist groups in the UK.13 This includes explicit calls for armed jihad against non-Muslims and opponents of the regime.13

The consistent designation of the IRGC as a terrorist organization by multiple international partners, coupled with the UK’s own intelligence assessments and the documented extremist ideology of the group, provides compelling evidence of its links to terrorism and extremism, further strengthening the case for proscription under UK law. This broad consensus across different sources and jurisdictions reinforces the conclusion that the IRGC meets the criteria for being considered a terrorist organization, not just based on its actions but also on its underlying ideology and objectives.

The Case for Proscribing the IRGC Under UK Law

Alignment with International Allies: Examining the US, Canadian, and Swedish Designations

The United States officially designated the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) in April 2019.4 This unprecedented step recognized the reality that Iran not only sponsors terrorism but that the IRGC actively participates in, finances, and promotes terrorism as a tool of statecraft.101 Canada followed suit in June 2024, listing the IRGC as a terrorist entity under its Criminal Code.2 This decision highlighted the IRGC’s engagement in terrorist acts, both independently and in association with listed terrorist groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas.15 Furthermore, the Swedish Parliament voted in favor of designating the IRGC as a terrorist organization in May 2023 2, underscoring the growing European concern over the IRGC’s destabilizing activities and its reach into European countries.68

These designations by key allies demonstrate a growing international consensus on the threat posed by the IRGC and the need for decisive action to counter its activities. Aligning with these partners by proscribing the IRGC would not only strengthen the UK’s own counter-terrorism efforts but also enhance its credibility and collaborative capacity within the global security landscape. By joining the US, Canada, and Sweden in this designation, the UK would send a clear and unified message to Iran that its state-sponsored terrorism will not be tolerated and would facilitate greater intelligence sharing and coordinated action against the IRGC’s networks and activities worldwide.

Strengthening the UK’s Counter-Terrorism Framework: Utilizing the Terrorism Act 2000 and the National Security Act 2023

The UK’s primary legislation for proscribing terrorist organizations is the Terrorism Act 2000, which grants the Home Secretary the power to proscribe an organization if they believe it is “concerned in terrorism”.13 The Act defines “terrorism” broadly to include the use or threat of serious violence against a person, serious damage to property, endangering a person’s life, creating a serious risk to the health or safety of the public, or action designed to seriously interfere with or disrupt an electronic system, when these actions are designed to influence the government or intimidate the public for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial, or ideological cause.13 The IRGC’s documented support for violent proxy groups, its involvement in plotting attacks against individuals in other countries, and its own use of force against civilian populations arguably meet this definition.

The more recent National Security Act 2023 provides additional legal tools to counter hostile state activity, including espionage and foreign interference, which could be utilized against individuals acting on behalf of the IRGC.13 Placing the whole of the Iranian state, including the IRGC, on the enhanced tier of the Foreign Influence Registration Scheme under this Act requires individuals working for them to register their activities or face imprisonment.24

Proscribing the IRGC under the Terrorism Act 2000 would significantly strengthen the UK’s counter-terrorism framework by creating specific criminal offenses related to membership, support, and association with the organization, thereby providing law enforcement with enhanced powers to disrupt its activities within the UK. This would complement the broader provisions of the National Security Act 2023 in addressing the multifaceted threats posed by the Iranian state. While the National Security Act targets a range of state threats, including those emanating from Iran, the Terrorism Act offers a more focused approach to organizations deemed to be involved in terrorism, allowing for specific prohibitions and penalties that could be more effective in countering the IRGC’s activities within the UK.

Addressing the Threat to UK Citizens and National Security: Evidence of IRGC Activities in the UK

As highlighted earlier, UK intelligence agencies have foiled numerous plots orchestrated or backed by the IRGC targeting British citizens and UK-based activists, including assassination and kidnapping attempts.13 These plots, revealed by the head of MI5, demonstrate a clear and present danger to individuals within the UK who are perceived as enemies of the Iranian regime.

The targeting of journalists working for Iran International, a media outlet critical of the Iranian regime, with surveillance and threats of serious violence, further underscores the direct threat the IRGC poses to freedom of speech and the safety of individuals within the UK.13 These incidents have even led to the relocation of some journalists for their safety.17 Recent charges against individuals in the UK for suspected espionage on behalf of Iran’s intelligence services, targeting UK-based journalists, further underscore the ongoing threat.24

The IRGC has also been implicated in the recruitment of British Muslims for espionage and potentially terror-related operations within the UK.13 This recruitment often occurs during visits to holy Shia sites in Iran and Iraq, highlighting the IRGC’s exploitation of religious connections for its malign purposes.27 Furthermore, the IRGC has been known to utilize UK-based organized criminal networks to conduct surveillance and potentially carry out attacks on its targets within the UK.13

The increasing evidence of the IRGC’s direct involvement in activities that threaten the safety and security of individuals within the UK underscores the urgent need for stronger measures, including proscription, to protect national security and the safety of residents. These activities demonstrate that the IRGC’s threat is not confined to the Middle East but extends directly to the UK, requiring a robust domestic counter-terrorism response.

Upholding Human Rights and Democratic Values: The IRGC’s Repressive Actions in Iran and Abroad

The IRGC has a well-documented history of gross human rights violations and the brutal suppression of domestic dissent within Iran.13 This includes the violent crackdown on protests, arbitrary arrests, torture, and extrajudicial killings.17 The IRGC’s ideology promotes violence and extremism, including calls to kill Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians through armed jihad, as documented in its training manuals.12

Furthermore, the IRGC supports numerous groups that actively undermine peace and stability in the Middle East and beyond, contributing to conflicts and human suffering.2 These actions demonstrate a clear disregard for international norms and the principles of democracy and human rights.

Banning the IRGC would align the UK with its commitment to human rights and democratic values by condemning an organization responsible for widespread repression and violence. The IRGC’s actions contradict the UK’s stated values, and proscription would send a clear message that such behavior is unacceptable and that the UK stands in solidarity with the Iranian people who are suffering under the regime’s oppression.

Arguments and Considerations Against Proscription

Potential Impact on Diplomatic Relations Between the UK and Iran

A primary concern raised against proscribing the IRGC is the potential negative impact on diplomatic relations between the UK and Iran. Some argue that banning the IRGC, which is a formal component of Iran’s armed forces, could be perceived by Tehran as a hostile act, potentially leading to a mutual expulsion of diplomats and a complete severing of diplomatic ties.42 Maintaining channels for communication with Tehran is viewed by some as crucial, particularly during times of heightened regional tensions, as it allows for direct engagement and the potential for de-escalation.42

Furthermore, there are fears of potential Iranian retaliation against British interests or dual nationals who may be residing in Iran if the IRGC is officially designated as a terrorist organization by the UK.19 This concern is amplified by Iran’s history of detaining foreign and dual nationals on spurious charges.55

The potential disruption of diplomatic channels and the risk of retaliation are significant considerations that the UK government must carefully weigh against the perceived benefits of proscription. Maintaining some level of diplomatic engagement, even if strained, could be seen as necessary for managing a range of issues, including the welfare of British citizens in Iran and broader regional stability.

The Legal Definition of Terrorism and its Application to State Entities

Another key consideration revolves around the legal definition of terrorism within the UK and its traditional application to non-state actors. Proscribing the IRGC, which is an integral part of the armed forces of a sovereign state, would represent a departure from the UK’s consistent policy over several decades.21 This has raised concerns about potentially blurring the lines between state-sponsored actions and terrorism as defined under UK law.

Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, has explicitly warned against destabilizing the UK’s well-established definition of terrorism by proscribing a state entity.52 There are also broader concerns that such a move could potentially lead to arguments for including other state forces, including those of allies, within the scope of terrorism legislation, which could have significant and unintended consequences for international relations and military cooperation.52 This raises fundamental questions about the legal precedent being set and the potential for upsetting the settled meaning of terrorism in domestic law.

Assessing the Effectiveness of a Ban Compared to Existing Sanctions and Measures

The IRGC is already subject to a comprehensive regime of UK sanctions targeting the organization in its entirety, as well as numerous individuals and entities associated with it.7 Consequently, some argue that formally proscribing the IRGC as a terrorist organization would be a largely symbolic gesture and might not yield significant practical benefits in terms of further constraining its activities.15 The IRGC, with its vast economic resources and sophisticated networks, has demonstrated a capacity to adapt and circumvent sanctions and bans.15 Therefore, the effectiveness of a ban in materially hindering the IRGC’s operations, given the existing sanctions regime and its demonstrated resilience, remains a key question that requires careful consideration.

Concerns About Unintended Consequences and Iranian Retaliation

Finally, the UK government must assess the potential for unintended consequences and the risk of Iranian retaliation should the IRGC be proscribed. There are concerns that such a move could lead to increased threats to UK interests and personnel stationed in the Middle East and potentially elsewhere.19 It could also further escalate tensions in an already highly volatile region, potentially leading to unforeseen and negative repercussions.23 Some analysts have even suggested that proscribing the IRGC could inadvertently lead to its further empowerment within the Iranian political system, potentially strengthening hardline elements.70 A thorough risk assessment is therefore crucial to fully understand the potential negative repercussions and to weigh them against the anticipated benefits of banning the IRGC.

The UK’s Approach to Similar Organizations: Lessons from the Proscription of Hezbollah

Comparing the IRGC and Hezbollah: Similarities in Ideology, Structure, and Activities

A relevant point of comparison when considering the proscription of the IRGC is the UK’s existing ban on Lebanese Hezbollah. Both the IRGC and Hezbollah are ideologically driven organizations with a fundamental commitment to exporting their revolutionary ideals, opposing the state of Israel, and challenging the influence of Western powers in the Middle East.4 Hezbollah was, in fact, created and continues to be heavily supported by the IRGC, receiving significant funding, training, and weapons that have enabled it to become a powerful actor in Lebanon and the wider region.4

Both organizations have a history of engaging in terrorist activities and actions that have been widely seen as destabilizing in the Middle East and beyond.2 The IRGC has been instrumental in the creation, arming, training, and financing of Hezbollah.13

The close relationship between the IRGC and Hezbollah, and the UK’s decision to proscribe Hezbollah, provide a relevant precedent for considering a ban on the IRGC. Examining the rationale and impact of Hezbollah’s proscription could offer valuable insights into the potential consequences and effectiveness of banning the IRGC.

The UK’s Experience with Proscribing Hezbollah and its Implications for the IRGC

The UK has taken a firm stance against Hezbollah, proscribing the organization in its entirety as a terrorist group.2 This decision was based on Hezbollah’s long history of involvement in terrorism and its continued threat to international peace and stability.13 The proscription of Hezbollah means that it is a criminal offense in the UK to belong to the organization, to invite support for it, to arrange meetings in support of it, or to display its symbols in public.18

Proscribing the IRGC could have similar implications for disrupting its activities within the UK and sending a strong message to the Iranian regime that its support for terrorism and its hostile actions on UK soil will not be tolerated.13 The UK’s experience with proscribing Hezbollah demonstrates that it is possible to designate an organization with significant political and military power as a terrorist group, even if it has ties to a state. This precedent could help address concerns about the IRGC being a state entity and inform the UK government’s decision-making process. The proscription of Hezbollah has provided law enforcement agencies with additional tools to counter its activities and has sent a clear signal of the UK’s condemnation of its actions. A similar approach towards the IRGC could yield comparable benefits in safeguarding UK national security and upholding its values.

Conclusion: The Importance of Proscribing the IRGC in the UK

The evidence presented in this report strongly suggests the importance of proscribing the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization in the UK. The IRGC’s history, structure, objectives, and documented activities both within Iran and internationally, particularly its direct threats to individuals in the UK, align with the criteria for proscription under the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000. Furthermore, the growing international consensus among key allies like the United States, Canada, and Sweden, who have already designated the IRGC as a terrorist entity, underscores the severity of the threat it poses.

While concerns regarding the potential impact on diplomatic relations with Iran, the legal complexities of proscribing a state entity, and the effectiveness of a ban compared to existing sanctions are valid and require careful consideration, they should not outweigh the imperative to protect UK citizens and national security. The precedent set by the UK’s proscription of Hezbollah, an organization heavily supported by the IRGC and sharing similar ideological and operational characteristics, demonstrates that such a measure is both feasible and justifiable.

Proscribing the IRGC would send a clear and unequivocal message to the Iranian regime that its state-sponsored terrorism and hostile activities on UK soil will not be tolerated. It would provide law enforcement agencies with enhanced powers to investigate and disrupt IRGC-linked networks and activities within the UK, complementing the provisions of the National Security Act 2023. Moreover, it would align the UK with its closest allies in a coordinated effort to counter a significant global threat and uphold the UK’s commitment to human rights and democratic values.

Recommendations

Based on the analysis presented in this report, the following policy recommendations are put forth for the UK government:

1. Proscribe the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a terrorist organization under the Terrorism Act 2000. The available evidence, including the IRGC’s support for terrorism, its involvement in plotting attacks in the UK, and its extremist ideology, meets the legal threshold for proscription.
2. Enhance enforcement of existing sanctions against the IRGC and its affiliates. While proscription is a crucial step, it should be accompanied by rigorous enforcement of current sanctions to further restrict the IRGC’s financial and operational capabilities.
3. Strengthen intelligence sharing and cooperation with international allies regarding the IRGC’s activities. Collaborative efforts with the US, Canada, Sweden, and other partners who have designated the IRGC will be vital in countering its global reach and impact.
4. Develop a clear communication strategy to explain the rationale behind the proscription to both the UK public and the international community. This strategy should emphasize the UK’s commitment to national security, human rights, and international law.
5. Continuously assess and adapt the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy towards Iran in response to evolving threats. This should include regular reviews of the proscription status and consideration of additional measures as needed.

By taking these decisive actions, the UK government can effectively address the significant threat posed by the IRGC, protect its citizens, and uphold its values on the global stage.